Where the Iron Crosses Grow

Encouraged by his success on the right, Kozlov kept reinforcing this sector in the hope of achieving a breakthrough. He directed the reserve 47th Army to send its 77th Mountain Rifle Division to support the right hook around the enemy line. Mattenklott responded to this alarming situation by repositioning Hitzfeld’s IR 213 and I./IR 105 to backstop the battered Romanians, while the 46. Infanterie-Division committed all its strength to holding the center of the Axis defensive line at Koi-Asan. Hitzfeld was inclined to take the offensive, and he aggressively led an attack on the morning of February 28 that temporarily recovered some ground on the northern flank. The crisis of the battle developed during the afternoon, as Kozlov committed his best remaining infantry against the Romanians, and they gave way. The fresh 77th Mountain Rifle Division succeeded in a minor breakthrough, which captured the village of Kiet, nearly outflanking the entire Axis defensive line. The 51st Army claimed the capture of over 100 Romanians. However, Gruppe Hitzfeld and the I./IR 105 were able to counterattack and retake the village. Blocked by the marshy and waterlogged terrain around Kiet, it proved impossible for Kozlov to expand his position in this sector and he was left holding an exposed salient. The wide marshes just north of Kiet were no-go terrain even for infantry.

While Mattenklott fed part of the 170. Infanterie-Division into the northern sector to allow Costescu’s battered division to go into reserve, the rest of the front was reduced to desultory combat levels on March 1. During the first three days of the offensive the 44th Army had conducting little more than nuisance attacks against the German XXX Armeekorps sector on the right, which allowed Manstein to concentrate his reserves against Lvov’s army. Kozlov was frustrated by his lack of progress in the center against Stützpunkt Koi-Asan, held by IR 42 and IR 72, which was the key to the Axis position, and by his inability to convert his success on the right into a real tactical advantage. Instead, Kozlov became fixated on mounting diversionary attacks to draw Manstein’s reserves away from Koi-Asan, but this proved wishful thinking. He ordered the Black Sea Fleet to bombard Axis positions around Feodosiya and Yalta, and, over the course of four nights, the battleship Parizhskaya Kommuna fired 100 rounds of 305mm against these targets, with the heavy cruiser Molotov and eight destroyers joining in as well.²⁷ A minor naval landing was made at Alushta on March 1, then withdrawn after four hours having achieved nothing.

Resolved to accomplish some signal success before weather and logistics brought his offensive to a premature end, Kozlov decided to make an all-out attack against Stützpunkt Koi-Asan on March 2. He deployed two rifle divisions, supported by the newly arrived 39th, 40th, and 55th Tank Brigades, and the 229th Separate Tank Battalion (OTB), against the strongpoint, but the Soviet armor piled up against the still-intact German obstacles and was shot to pieces by Panzerjägers and artillery. Furthermore, the Luftwaffe was finally able to provide some air cover, including 40 Stuka sorties from III./StG 77 that targeted the massed Soviet armor.²⁸ The Soviets admitted that they lost 93 tanks on this one day, in addition to about 40 other tanks lost in the opening days of the offensive. Nonetheless, Kozlov’s assault did overrun a battery of four 14.9cm s.FH 37(t) howitzers, and a VVS bomber raid on Vladislavovka destroyed an ammunition dump containing 23 tons of munitions.²⁹ Yet it was apparent that Kozlov’s offensive had failed to dent the Koi-Asan or Korpech’ positions, and he suspended his offensive on March 3, after losing a great deal of infantry and most of his armor, including 28 of his 36 KV-1 tanks. The 51st Army was left holding a salient in open terrain across the northern part of the front, but only security troops could be posted in this exposed area. At great cost, Kozlov’s first offensive had bent back the left wing of XXXXII Armeekorps, but the Koi-Asan strongpoint held firm in the center. In his memoirs, Manstein downplayed the Soviet offensive by writing that “we eventually succeeded in containing the enemy breakthrough in the northern sector,” while omitting the near-disaster on the first day.³⁰ He did decide to mass all his assault guns at Koi-Asan, including the newly arrived 2./Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 249.