Where the Iron Crosses Grow

Manstein was sufficiently concerned by the loss of Stützpunkt Korpech’ that he decided to mount an immediate counterattack with the 22. Panzer-Division, which had just arrived in the Crimea. The OKH had sent the new division to AOK 11 in order to spearhead a major counteroffensive against the Crimean Front, but now Manstein decided to use it in a local counterattack to retake a battalion-size strongpoint. Nor was the 22. Panzer-Division complete, since parts of it were still arriving from France and the unit was untested in combat. Nevertheless, Manstein imprudently decided to employ Oberstleutnant Wilhelm Koppenburg’s Panzer-Regiment 204 without much infantry or engineer support. Furthermore, the bulk of Koppenburg’s tanks were ex-Czech Pz 38(t) models, which could not stand up to Kozlov’s T-34s and KV-1 if encountered. When Koppenburg’s two Panzer Abteilungen crossed the front line at 0600hrs on March 20, a thick fog limited visibility to 100 yards or less. Unfamiliar with the terrain, one of Koppenburg’s battalions became disoriented in the fog and the other ran into a minefield. The counterattack then became a confused meeting engagement in the fog, which went very badly for the Germans. Alerted to the approach of German armor, the Soviet 55th Tank Brigade quickly appeared with a battalion of T-26 light tanks and four KV-1s, which blocked access to Korpech’. Attempting to maneuver, I./Pz. Regt 204 ran into a nest of Soviet 45mm antitank guns and suffered 40 percent losses. Eventually, Koppenburg aborted the counterattack by 0900hrs, having completely failed in his mission. The 22. Panzer-Division’s counterattack at Korpech’ was one of the most badly bungled German armored attacks of the entire war on the Eastern Front; 32 of 142 tanks had been lost (including nine Pz IIs, 17 Pz 38(t)s, and six Pz IVs) and the division had to be sent to the rear to refit.³⁴ Using tanks without proper battlefield reconnaissance or the use of air, artillery, infantry, or engineer support went completely against German combined-arms doctrine, and the failure to properly plan or support the attack was entirely Manstein’s fault. Kozlov’s second offensive had failed to achieve a breakthrough, but he had dented the German main line of resistance, and the decimation of the 22. Panzer-Division prevented Manstein from gaining the initiative.

After taking just a week to replace losses and restock his artillery ammunition, Kozlov began his Third Offensive on March 26, intent upon taking the tenacious Koi-Asan Stützpunkt. However, this attack fizzled out very quickly, and the Crimea Front was incapable of making a serious effort until early April. The Luftwaffe mounted continuous raids on the port facility at Kerch, which seriously disrupted Soviet logistic operations, and, consequently, Kozlov could not resume his offensive until April 9, but with fewer tanks and artillery pieces than required.³⁵ Once again, Mehklis pressed Kozlov to commit his armor while German lines were still unbroken, which was akin to smashing against a wall at high speed. Manstein had also begun to receive reinforcements in the spring of 1942, including the 28. leichte Infanterie-Division, which was equipped with the new 2.8cm s.PzB 41 tapered-bore antitank guns. On the first day of the latest Soviet offensive, Obergefreiter Emanuel Czernik destroyed seven T-26 tanks and one BT with the new weapon, at ranges of 70–660 yards.³⁶ Unlike larger antitank guns, the low-silhouette s.PzB 41 could be easily concealed even in flat terrain like the eastern Crimea. After three days of unsuccessfully pounding on German defenses at Koi-Asan, Kozlov finally decided to halt his offensives and rest and resupply his exhausted divisions. As a result of these four offensives, most of the Crimean Front’s combat power was concentrated on its right flank in the 51st Army, while the 44th Army had not received priority and the 47th Army was little more than a holding command. Unwittingly, lax Soviet radio communications during the March–April fighting had enabled German signals troops to intercept traffic between the Crimean Front’s army-level headquarters and to determine their positions – which were then provided to the Luftwaffe.³⁷