Where the Iron Crosses Grow

During the four months from January to April 1942, Kozlov’s Crimean Front (including the forces in Sevastopol) suffered a crippling 352,000 casualties for the liberation of just the Kerch Peninsula. Most of these losses were incurred during the four offensives conducted between February 27 and April 11, which made only modest tactical gains. In the same time period, Manstein’s AOK 11 suffered a total of 24,120 casualties, indicating an extremely unfavorable 14-1 casualty ratio for Kozlov. Indeed, it is clear that AOK 11 made an impressive stand against long odds at the Parpach Narrows, while maintaining the siege of Sevastopol – a great feat of generalship. On the other hand, after making a daring amphibious landing at Feodosiya in December 1941, the Crimean Front reverted to a dull, plodding form of operations. Given the excessive casualties of the attackers for marginal gains across unsuitable terrain, Kozlov’s four offensives bear a striking resemblance to British offensives at Passchendaele in 1917, but these equally large battles have been almost completely forgotten today.

CHAPTER 6 The German Conquest, May–July 1942

“For the Soviets, there is only surrender or annihilation.”

German newsreel commentary, May 20, 1942

As spring arrived, Hitler began issuing orders for the upcoming summer offensive with which he intended to knock the Soviet Union out of the war. This time, the main effort would be made in the south with Heeresgruppe Süd, toward the Caucasus oil fields and the Volga, while Heeresgruppen Nord and Mitte remained on the defensive. Yet Hitler and the OKH recognized that it would be necessary to clear up the Soviet Barvenkovo Salient south of Kharkov and to finish off Soviet resistance in the Crimea before embarking upon the larger task. By eliminating Soviet resistance in the Crimea, Manstein’s AOK 11 would be free to support the advance into the Caucasus. In accordance with Führer Directive 41 issued on April 5, Manstein was directed to eliminate Kozlov’s forces in the Kerch Peninsula first, then Heeresgruppe Süd would deal with the Barvenkovo Salient with Operation Fridericus, and then, afterwards, Manstein would complete operations in the Crimea by capturing the fortress of Sevastopol. Manstein flew to Rastenburg in East Prussia to discuss his future plans with Hitler, and stated that substantial Luftwaffe air support was an essential requirement for rapid success in the Crimea. Hitler agreed, and promised to send the elite Fliegerkorps VIII to support his attacks. However, unlike Barbarossa, Hitler stressed that the Luftwaffe no longer had the resources to conduct simultaneous major offensives, but instead would have to shuttle its resources between the Crimea and the other armies of Heeresgruppe Süd, meaning that Manstein’s attacks would have to stick to tight schedules.

Even before Kozlov’s fourth offensive ended, Manstein and his staff began developing an operational plan to crush all three armies of the Crimean Front in one bold stroke. The offensive was named Operation Trappenjagd (“Bustard Hunt”) and would begin in early May, once the ground had hardened. Unusually, Hitler granted Manstein considerable autonomy on how he conducted his offensive, as long as it was completed on time. A key part of the plan relied upon the transfer of Fliegerkorps VIII to the Crimea prior to Trappenjagd in order to seize air superiority at the outset of the offensive. Manstein believed that if the Luftwaffe could gain air superiority over the Crimea he could then mass enough combat power to smash in Kozlov’s weaker left wing, comprising General-Lieutenant Stepan I. Cherniak’s 44th Army, then exploit the situation before Kozlov could react. The plan was typical of Manstein’s philosophy of war, based upon risk, maneuver, and concentration of force at the decisive point. By normal principles of military science, success was unlikely, since Manstein was able to assemble only the 22. Panzer-Division, five German infantry divisions, and two and a half Romanian divisions to attack a total of 19 Soviet divisions and four tank brigades. Outnumbered by more than 2-1, Manstein’s forces seemed better suited for defense, but he counted on this disparity to lull Kozlov into a false sense of security.