Where the Iron Crosses Grow

Manstein had learned from his experience in developing his version of the Fall Gelb plan for the attack through the Ardennes in 1940 that significant operational-level surprise could be achieved by attacking in places that the enemy did not expect and by using methods they had not considered. He deliberately chose to place his Schwerpunkt in the least favorable terrain: the swampy southern sector held by Cherniak’s 44th Army. He intended to use three infantry divisions from Generalleutnant Fretter-Pico’s XXX Armeekorps in the first echelon to breach the Soviet lines, then, once a breach was achieved, to push the 22. Panzer-Division to exploit the hole in Cherniak’s front. It is apparent that Manstein learned from the debacle with 22. Panzer-Division in March, and this time he intended to hold his armor back until Fretter-Pico’s infantry breached the enemy’s defenses. Instead of using paratroopers – which were not available – Manstein intended to conduct a small-scale amphibious landing behind Cherniak’s front, using the assault boats from the 902. Sturmboote-Kommando. This was a high-risk operation – if Fretter-Pico’s troops did not break through quickly, the amphibious force would be isolated and destroyed. Based upon his experience from the December offensive at Sevastopol, Manstein had also developed new tactics for breaking through enemy fortified lines, based upon the close cooperation of infantry Stossgruppen, assault guns, pioneers, Panzerjägers, and flak troops. Consequently, Manstein provided Fretter-Pico with the tools to unlock Cherniak’s defense: a total of 57 StuG III assault guns from the 190., 197., and 249. Sturmgeschütz-Abteilungen, two batteries of 8.8cm flak guns, and plentiful engineer support. Furthermore, at least a dozen of the StuG IIIs were equipped with the new L/48 long 7.5cm cannon, which greatly improved their antitank capability. Manstein also integrated deception into the Trappenjagd plan by having Mattenklott’s XXXXII Armeekorps conduct feints against the 51st Army, which made it look as though any German counterattack would occur in the northern sector, while Fretter-Pico’s troops did not occupy assault positions until the night before the attack. In fact, Mattenklott’s northern sector was seriously denuded of troops in order to strengthen Fretter-Pico’s corps, leaving just the 46. Infanterie-Division and the Romanian Mountain Corps to keep the 51st Army at bay. For once, Axis operational-security measures worked, and AOK 11 was able to conceal the fact that more than half of its combat forces were massed against the southernmost point of the Soviet line and that the rest of the front was only lightly held.

General-Major Yevgeniy M. Nikolaenko, commander of the VVS-Crimean Front, was a 36-year-old fighter pilot who had earned an HSU decoration in a fighter melee over China in August 1938. He was an up-and-coming star of the VVS, but it all vanished on the morning of May 8, 1942, when Operation Trappenjagd kicked off. Fliegerkorps VIII mounted a maximum effort, flying over 2,100 sorties during the course of the day, beginning with attacks on Nikolaenko’s forward airfields at Bagerovo and Marfovka. It was like June 1941 all over again, with the VVS caught flat-footed as Luftwaffe bombers swept in and destroyed parked aircraft on the ground. Richthofen then allowed his four Jagdgruppen to conduct fighter sweeps across the Kerch Peninsula during the day, resulting in a claim of 57 air-to-air “kills” on the first day of the offensive. By noon, Nikolaenko had lost perhaps one-quarter of his aircraft and had clearly lost control of the air over the Kerch Peninsula. During the first two days of Trappenjagd, Fliegerkorps VIII flew 3,800 sorties and shattered the VVS-Crimean Front; the Luftwaffe admitted losing 23 of their own aircraft against over 100 Soviet aircraft.

Cherniak, born into a Belarusian peasant family, was a 41-year-old career infantryman who had served as an advisor in the Spanish Civil War and had later been awarded the HSU for his performance as a division commander during the Russo-Finnish War. He had an admirable record for a Soviet commander, having dodged the purges and managed to avoid suffering any notable reverses in the field. Like Nikolaenko, Cherniak’s heretofore-laudable reputation was wrecked in the opening hours of Trappenjagd. Three minutes before sunrise, XXX Armeekorps’ artillery began a ten-minute artillery preparation on Cherniak’s forward units at 0415hrs. Four Nebelwerfer batteries poured smoke and high-explosive on the identified Soviet positions. The 44th Army had two divisions – the 63rd Mountain Rifle and the 276th Rifle Division – holding a 4-mile stretch of front line, then an antitank ditch located 2 miles further back, guarded by the 157th and 404th Rifle Divisions. Cherniak’s reserve consisted of the 39th and 56th Tank Brigades, located near Arma-Eli.