Where the Iron Crosses Grow

Based upon the experience gained with Brigade Ziegler during the pursuit operations in November 1941, Manstein decided to assemble an even larger and more capable motorized Kampfgruppe for the pursuit phase of Trappenjagd. Oberst Karl Albrecht von Groddeck, an experienced commander of motorized infantry, was brought to AOK 11 to take command of an ad hoc brigade comprised of Aufklärungs-Abteilung (mot.) 22, I./ Infanterie-Regiment 391, Panzerjäger-Abteilung 560, schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 154 (12x 149mm s.FH 37(t)), the 6./ Artillerie-Regiment 818 (4x 10cm s.K 18), one battery of six StuG III assault guns from Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 197, a special-forces company from z.b.V. 800 “Brandenburg,” one Nebelwerfer battery, two flak batteries, one company from Pionier-Bataillon 173, and the Romanian 3rd Motorized Cavalry Regiment. In addition, Gruppe Müller was attached to Brigade Groddeck, with truck-mounted Infanterie-Regiment 401, I./Infanterie-Regiment 105, Panzer-Abteilung 223, a panzer company with 18 captured-Soviet tanks, two Romanian 15cm batteries, a battery from Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 190, and more pioneers and Panzerjägers. Altogether, Groddeck had a division-size task with five infantry battalions, 30 armored fighting vehicles, and 30 artillery pieces.⁴ Every truck, car, and motorcycle that could be temporarily spared in the Crimea was given to Groddeck’s brigade to motorize as many sub-units as possible, but some of the infantry still rode on bicycles, pulled on ropes behind trucks.

Belatedly, Cherniak committed his 56th Tank Brigade and 126th Separate Tank Battalion (OTB) with 98 tanks, including seven KV-1, to attack the 28. leichte Infanterie-Division’s breakthrough. However, by the time that the Soviet armor assembled on the open steppe, Stukas from StG 77 and Hs 129 Bs from SchG 1 arrived and blasted them to pieces in a hail of bombs and cannon fire; 48 tanks were knocked out, including all seven KV-1.⁵ Kozlov did not realize how badly the 44th Army’s front had been breached until German pioneers had almost completed bridging the antitank ditch, thereby opening the way for Brigade Groddeck to begin rushing eastward toward Kerch.

The day of decision for Operation Trappenjagd was May 9, and it quickly went badly for Kozlov’s Crimean Front. Soviet command and control was apparently badly disrupted in the initial Luftwaffe raids – the 51st Army commander, General-Lieutenant Lvov, was mortally wounded in one raid, and Kozlov still failed to comprehend the extent of the German breakthrough in the 44th Army sector – he merely ordered Cherniak to clear it up with local counterattacks. He did give Cherniak one rifle division from the 47th Army reserve, but this was too little and too late. German pioneers had spent the night of May 8/9 filling in the 12-yard-wide antitank ditch and removing mines, wire, and steel beams in order to clear a path for the 22. Panzer-Division, but pockets of bypassed Soviet troops prevented this task from being accomplished until midday on May 9. In the interim, the 28. leichte Infanterie-Division boldly moved northeast and seized Arma-Eli, while the 132. Infanterie-Division and Brigade Groddeck continued to advance eastward against light resistance. Cherniak continued counterattacking with his remaining forces, but these uncoordinated regiment-size operations were easily defeated by XXX Armeekorps. The Stukas of StG 77 and the Hs 129Bs of SchG 1 also eliminated most of Cherniak’s armor, and Bf 109 fighters shot down 25 Soviet aircraft attempting to support the 44th Army counterattack. Cherniak’s counterattack was a dismal failure.

During the fighting around Arma-Eli, Brigade Groddeck managed to skirt around the 44th Army’s shattered left flank and to boldly advance over 15 miles into the Soviet rear areas. Kozlov had left only the 11th NKVD Division and the depleted 72nd Cavalry Division in the rear to secure the final defensive line along the so-called “Turkish Rampart,” another example of ancient fortifications in the Crimea, but in reality little more than a time-worn berm and ditch fieldwork. Unfortunately, Soviet command and control was so disrupted that neither unit was aware that German forces were approaching their positions. Suddenly, a motorized raiding party of the Groddeck Brigade descended upon Marfovka airfield on the afternoon of May 9 and destroyed some 35 I-153 fighter-bombers on the ground. Kozlov was shocked when he heard this, and the growing fear that the Germans were running amok in the rear areas helped to shatter Soviet morale.