Where the Iron Crosses Grow

In order to capture Sevastopol, Manstein knew that he would need an unprecedented amount of firepower to break through Petrov’s multiple lines of defense. Recognizing that his previous offensives had lacked sufficient air and artillery support, Manstein was determined that his next attack would have as many combat multipliers in his favor as possible. While executing Trappenjagd, he and his staff drafted Operation Störfang (Sturgeon Haul) for the final offensive against fortress Sevastopol. Before sending his combinedarms Stossgruppen into the attack, he wanted a massive five-day air and artillery bombardment to neutralize as much of Petrov’s defenses as possible.

Traditionally, the German Army relied upon 10.5cm and 15cm howitzers to provide the backbone for its division-level medium artillery in both World War I and II. Heavier artillery of various calibers, including rail artillery, fell under control of the Heeresartillerie, which reinforced army and army group-size operations. Corps-level artillery usually consisted of pieces between 15cm and 21cm caliber weapons, although it did include the 10.5cm s.K 18 cannon. In 1940, the Wehrmacht began fielding Nebelwerfer units equipped with multiple rocket launchers, which also fell under the Heeresartillerie. Although German armies had a reputation for possessing powerful heavy artillery, they actually had very little of it, and most of the weapons they had were not of German origin. Since German operational-level doctrine was based upon the concept of Bewegungskrieg, or maneuver warfare, greater emphasis had been placed upon medium-artillery weapons that could support mobile operations, not heavy artillery intended to break through heavily fortified lines or to conduct siege warfare. Consequently, the German preference was to go around fortified areas like the French Maginot Line, and if forced to mount a siege, as at places like Warsaw or Leningrad, to rely upon the Luftwaffe to pound the enemy into submission. However, at Sevastopol in 1942, Manstein did not have this luxury, since he was under tight time constraints to release Fliegerkorps VIII back to Heeresgruppe Süd in time for the main German summer offensive – Fall Blau – set to begin on June 28.

Yet as war approached in the mid-1930s, the Wehrmacht’s leadership became concerned about its limited ability to overcome either the French or Czech border fortifications. The German Heereswaffenamt (Army Weapon’s Office) issued requirements to Krupp and Rheinmetall-Borsig in 1936 to develop a variety of heavy-artillery pieces. Ideally, these two companies would have cooperated in developing a few practical weapons for the Wehrmacht that could be produced in quantity. In reality, both companies took different directions and allowed their engineers to present to the Heereswaffenamt a wide variety of often-impractical artillery prototypes with non-standardized calibers. Little or no thought was given to ease of manufacturing, ammunition logistics, or deployment issues – instead, the bigger the gun, the better. When war came sooner than expected in 1939, the Wehrmacht was forced to accept a number of these prototypes into service, even though they were expensive and available in only token numbers. Krupp had begun simply enough by rebuilding its original 1906-vintage 42cm howitzer into the “Gamma” howitzer, of which only one was provided to the Wehrmacht in 1940. However, Krupp engineers endeavored to show off their talent in building a new generation of 28cm rail artillery as well as a massive 80cm cannon that would be named “Dora.” Building a small number of 28cm railroad guns made sense since they were inherently mobile and could easily achieve ranges of 20 miles with a 284kg shell. On the other hand, the 80cm Dora became an iconic weapon during the assault on Sevastopol in June 1942 – just as Nazi propagandists had intended – but it was inherently impractical as a weapon due to its huge size, low rate of fire, and exorbitant requirements for personnel and other resources. Rheinmetall initially took a similar direction as Krupp and developed the 35.5cm M1 howitzer; the Wehrmacht accepted one M1 in July 1940 and it arrived at AOK 11 in late October 1941. Yet Rheinmetall’s engineers became very interested in the benefits of plunging fire provided by heavy mortars and began developing the 60cm “Karl” series of super-heavy mortars. While the 124-ton Karl was semi-mobile on tracks and could fire an impressive 1,700kg or 2,170kg concrete-piercing shell, it had an effective range of only 3–4 miles, which required it to fire from practically the front line, and exposed it to enemy counterfire.