Where the Iron Crosses Grow

Richthofen’s Fliegerkorps VIII actually dropped more high explosive on Sevastopol on the first day of Störfang than Zuckertort’s gunners. Since most of the bombers were based less than 60 miles from the city, they could fly three or more sorties a day with maximum bomb loads. On day one, Fliegerkorps VIII dropped 525 tons of bombs on Sevastopol. Major Werner Hoffmann’s I./KG 100 specialized in dropping the Luftwaffe’s largest bombs against critical targets like Morgunov’s coastal batteries. On June 2, Hoffmann’s He-111H-6 bombers dropped one 1,700kg SD 1700 “Sigismund” semi-armor-piercing bomb and seven 1,400kg PC 1400 “Fritz” armor-piercing bombs.¹³ Initially, Richthofen concentrated his effort against the harbor area and the two VVS-ChF airbases, which were under constant observation. Captain Konstantin S. Alekseyev, who commanded the 1st Squadron of the 6th Guards Fighter Regiment, was stationed at the Chersonese airfield. Alekseyev was the top-scoring ace in the VVS-ChF with about eight “kills” by the start of Störfang, and his squadron, equipped with Yak-1 fighters, was badly outnumbered by Fliegerkorps VIII, but gamely took to the skies every day to attempt to intercept German bombers.¹⁴

On June 3–4, Zuckertort’s gunners fired less ammunition and mostly medium artillery, with only minor contributions from the 30.5cm mortars. Much of the bombardment was focused on a few key hills on the right flank of Sector IV, which is where LIV Armeekorps intended to make its main effort. Haccius Ridge and the Ölberg – as designated by the Germans – were held by the Soviet 3rd Battalion, 514th Rifle Regiment, and offered a commanding view of the Bel’bek River valley. The Gamma mortar fired 30 42cm rounds against the Ölberg, while Haccius Ridge was pummeled by 24cm howitzers rounds. Nevertheless, the 514th Rifle Regiment reported only 32 casualties during the five-day bombardment. On their right, the 79th Naval Infantry Brigade held a trio of hills at the junction of the Bel’bek River and Kamyschly Ravine, which the Germans dubbed the Bunkerberg, the Stellenberg, and the Eisenbahnberg. Zuckertort’s artillery pounded these hills daily, and the Eisenbahnberg was singled out for attention with 20 “Gamma” rounds, 30 30.5cm rounds, and 40 28cm rounds, but only managed to kill or wound about 20 percent of the dug-in Soviet naval infantrymen. Most of Zuckertort’s artillery was focused against Petrov’s III and IV Defensive Sectors, with only a single battery of 30.5cm mortars supporting the XXX Armeekorps barrage in the south.

On the other side, Petrov had expected a German offensive, but the Stavka did not believe that it could last for more than two weeks and thus had not provided him with the means to sustain a longer battle. Instead, they had put the bulk of available resources into Kozlov’s Crimean Front, which now no longer existed. In fact, Petrov’s artillery was unprepared for a protracted slugging match against Zuckertort’s guns. His artillery commander, General-Major of Artillery Nikolai K. Ryzhi, had direct control over six army-level artillery regiments: three medium and three light. These units possessed a total of about 156 artillery pieces: 36 152mm ML-20 howitzers, 12 155mm Schneider M1917 howitzers, four 122mm A-19 guns, 40 107mm M1910/30 guns, and about 60 76.2mm F-22 guns. While the ML-20s had better range than the German s.FH 18 15cm howitzers, many of Ryzhi’s guns were in poor condition after more than ten months of continuous use; in the 18th Guards Artillery Regiment, for example, the ML-20s had used 80–90 percent of their barrel life and the 107mm guns had used 90–100 percent. Firing guns with worn-out barrels greatly decreased their accuracy and increased the chance of malfunctions, including burst barrels that could injure the crew. Ammunition was also in short supply; the ML-20s were in decent shape with 390 rounds per gun, but the 155mm howitzers only had 75 rounds per gun, the 122mm had 100, and the 107mm 158. This meant that Petrov’s heaviest artillery had to conserve its fire and that there was insufficient ammunition for a long battle. Even if the Black Sea Fleet brought in more ammunition, most of the guns were so worn out that many were operating in a degraded condition. The 76mm guns were in much better technical shape and had about 300 rounds per gun, plus another 900 rounds per gun stored in warehouses in Sevastopol, making them the most reliable – if not most effective – Soviet artillery during the final battle for Sevastopol. In addition, there was a single multiple rocket-launcher unit – Major Dmitri D. Kush-Zharko’s 53rd Guards Mortar Battalion, with 12 BM-8 82mm launchers. In contrast to Petrov’s impoverished artillery ammunition supply, most of Manstein’s medium artillery started the battle with five or six basic loads of ammunition, with more en route.