Generalleutnant Johannes Zuckertort’s HArko 306 (Higher Artillery Command) began assembling its artillery park for Störfang
in mid-May 1942. Except for the sole M1 howitzer in AOK 11, most of the super-heavy weapons such as “Dora,” “Karl,” the “Gamma” howitzer, and the pair of 28cm “schwere Bruno” railroad guns did not arrive at Sevastopol until late May 1942. In fact, the Wehrmacht had difficulty assembling an adequate siege train for Sevastopol, and much of Zuckertort’s heaviest artillery was of Czech origin, including a 42cm M17 Skoda howitzer, 16 30.5cm Mörser M17 L/12s, four 24cm H39 howitzers, and 16 14.9cm s.FH 37(t) howitzers. Including the corps- and division-level artillery, Zuckertort’s artillery had 20 different types of calibers at Sevastopol, which greatly exacerbated the logistic situation. While Zuckertort had amassed 183,750 10.5cm and 47,300 15cm rounds for the medium artillery, as well as over 23,000 Nebelwerfer rockets, his German-built heavy guns had very little ammunition to shoot. When schwere Artillerie-Abteilung (E) 672 arrived with Dora on May 26 it possessed only 48 rounds, and schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 833 brought only 122 60cm rounds for its three Karl mortars. The two 42cm howitzers had 276 rounds between the two of them and the M1 had just 352 rounds of 35.5cm ammunition.12 Rather than the photogenic Dora and Karl, Zuckertort’s real heavy firepower would reside with the Czech-built 30.5cm mortars and 14.9cm s.FH 37(t) howitzers and their large stockpiles of ammunition. That did not fit the propaganda ideal of German engineering prowess.____________
In preparation for the artillery bombardment, Zuckertort had directed his three Beobachtungs-Abteilungen
(Observation Battalions), to conduct a thorough survey of all visible Soviet fortifications and fieldworks. During April–May, the survey platoons from these invaluable units developed very detailed maps of the enemy’s defenses, which were registered in a grid system. Essentially, each grid became a “kill box,” with every bunker and enemy position assigned a unique number. These maps became the basis for Zuckertort’s artillery fire plan and Richthofen’s Fliegerkorps VIII bombardment plan. Zuckertort’s HArko 306 would direct all of AOK 11’s Heeresartillerie during the bombardment, as well as LIV Armeekorps’ subordinate corps- and divisional-level artillery batteries. The XXX Armeekorps artillery would be directed by General der Artillerie Robert Martinek’s Arko 110, while the Romanian Mountain Corps artillery was semi-autonomous but was also worked into the fire-support plan. Richthofen would direct the concurrent Luftwaffe air strikes on Sevastopol. Although often described as “the heaviest German artillery barrage” or “the most intense barrage” ever laid down on the Eastern Front, Zuckertort’s artillery preparation was not based upon massed, continuous bombardment as in World War I. Rather, it was based upon methodical shoot-observeshoot tactics that would sweep the targets in each grid until they were damaged or destroyed. Once this was achieved, the infantry would go in.At 0540hrs on June 2, the Czech-built 14.9cm s.FH 37(t) howitzers of schwere Artillerie-Abteilung 737 fired the opening rounds of Operation Störfang.
Manstein observed the bombardment through Zeiss-made Scnfernrohr (scissors binoculars). The shelling started slowly, while registration fire gradually zeroed in on Soviet positions in the main defensive belt around Mekenzievy Mountain. Then the division-level 10.5cm and 15cm howitzers joined in at 0600hrs, firing three-round missions against specific targets in the enemy security belt. However, most medium guns fired no more than six to 12 rounds on the first day. German forward observers would then wait for the dust to settle and assess the effect on targets – either ordering a repeat fire mission or recommending moving on to the next target on the list. Overhead, the Hs 126Bs of 3.(H)/13 also passed on spotting reports to HArko 306. The two 60cm Karl mortars – “Odin” and “Thor” – each fired one test round, then remained silent for the next four days. Most of the other heavy artillery fired a few rounds each, but the two 28cm “schwere Bruno” railroad guns fired 104 rounds and two batteries of obsolete 28cm howitzers fired 330 rounds. At 1100hrs, the corps-level artillery joined in with 21cm mortars firing at forward Soviet positions. Zuckertort was hoping to provoke Petrov’s artillery into responding so that they could be targeted and destroyed, but most of the Soviet batteries remained silent on the first day.