Сталин и Гитлер

20. Bayer, Evolution of Soviet General Staff, pp. 152–3; Erickson, Soviet High Command, pp. 293–4.

21. L. Samuelson Plans for Stalin’s War Machine: Tukhachevskii and Military-Economic Planning, 1925–1941 (London, 2000), pp. 11–15, 17–18, 37–8; Boetticher, Industrialisierungspolitik, p. 207.

22. Samuelson, Plans for Stalin’s War Machine, pp. 22–3.

23. Y. Dyakov and T. Bushuyeva (eds) The Red Army and the Wehrmacht: How the Soviets Militarized Germany, 1922–1933 (New York, 1995) pp. 18–26; on the ‘Statistical Society’ see B. A. Carroll Design for Total War: Arms and Economics in the Third Reich (The Hague, 1968), pp. 54–7, 64–71. See too E. W. Hansen Reichswehr und Industrie: Rüstungswirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und wirtschaftliche Mobilmachungsvorbereitungen, 1923–1932 (Boppard am Rhein, 1978).

24. Hitler, Secret Book, pp. 5, 15.

25. Treue, ‘Hitlers Denkschrift’, p. 206.

26. Stalin, Problems of Leninism, pp. 520–21, ‘Address to graduates from Red Army Academies’, 4 May 1935.

27. Stalin, Problems of Leninism, p. 405, The Results of the First Five-Year Plan’, report to the CC Plenum, 7 January 1933.

28. L. Samuelson ‘Mikhail Tukhachevsky and War-Economic Planning: Reconsiderations on the Pre-War Soviet Military Build-Up’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 9 (1996), p. 828.

29. R. W. Davies and M. Harrison ‘Defence spending and defence industry in the 1930s’, in J. Barber and M. Harrison (eds) The Soviet De fence-Industry Complex from Stalin to Khrushchev (London, 2000), p. 73; R. W. Davies ‘Soviet Military Expenditure and the Armaments Industry 1929–1933: A Reconsideration’, Europe – Asia Studies, 45 (1993), pp. 577–86.

30. Samuelson, Plans for Stalin’s War Machine, pp. 128–43; T. Martin ‘The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing’, Journal of Modern History, 70 (1998), pp. 837–47.

31. D. Stone Hammer and Rifl e: the Militarization of the Soviet Union 1926–1933 (Lawrence, Kans., 2000), pp. 185–6: Stalin told Voroshilov after the Manchurian invasion that ‘things with Japan are complicated, serious’.

32. Treue, ‘Hitlers Denkschrift’, p. 204; Stalin, Problems of Leninism, p. 461, Report to the Seventeenth Congress of the CPSU, 26 January 1924.

33. B.-J. Wendt Grossdeutschland: Aussenpolitik und Kriegsvorbereitung des Hitler-Regimes (Munich, 1987).

34. R. J. Overy ‘From “Uralbomber” to “Amerikabomber”: the Luftwaffe and Strategic Bombing’, Journal of Strategic Studies, I (1978), pp. 155–6.

35. W. S. Dunn The Soviet Economy and the Red Army 1930–1945 (London, 1995), p. 2–1; see too R. L. Schweller Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest (New York, 1998), pp. 206–7. Schweller calculates a ‘power weight’ in 1938/9, based on resources and military spending, of 100 for Germany, 72.5 for the USSR, 29.0 for Britain, 20.2 for the USA and 15.3 for France.

36. Davies, ‘Soviet Military Expenditure’, pp. 590–91, 601; G. Kennedy The Economics of Defence (London, 1975), p. 79; S. Andic and J. Veverka ‘The Growth of Government Expenditure in Germany’, Finanzarchiv, 25 (1964), p. 261. The fi gure in 1913 was 3.6 per cent.

37. Dunn, Hitler’s Nemesis, pp. 26–32; W. Deist ‘Die Aufrüstung der Wehrmacht’, in W. Deist et al. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg (Stuttgart, 1979), p. 447. The fi gure by September 1939 was 2.87 million men.

38. M. Harrison Soviet Planning in Peace and War, 1938–1945 (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 250–53; Samuelson, ‘Mikhail Tukhachevsky’, pp. 805–9; R. Wagenführ Die deutsche Industrie im Kriege (Berlin, 1963), p. 74.

39. Overy, ‘From “Uralbomber” to “Amerikabomber” ‘, pp. 155–7; A. Bagel-Bohlan Hitlers industrielle Kriegsvorbereitung im Dritten Reich 1936 bis 1939 (Koblenz, 1975), pp. 117–21.

40. J. Rohwer and M. Monakov Stalin’s Ocean-Going Fleet: Soviet Naval Strategy and Shipbuilding Programme 1935–1953 (London, 2001), pp. 54–62, 103, 229–56.

41. J. Dülffer Weimar, Hitler und die Marine: Reichspolitik und Flottenbau 1920–1939 (Düsseldorf, 1973), pp. 488–504; W. Deist The Wehrmacht and German Rearmament (London, 1981), pp. 82–4.

42. T. M. Nichols The Sacred Cause: Civil-Military Confl ict over Soviet National Security, 1917–1992 (Ithaca, NY, 1993), p. 50; A. van Ishoven Messerschmitt (London, 1975), pp. 115, 172.

43. IWM, FD 3056/49 ‘Statistical Material on the German Manpower Position’, 31, July 1945, Table 7, based on returns from Reichsgruppe Industrie to the statistical offi ce.

44. J. Gillingham ‘The “Deproletarianization” of German Society: Vocational Training in the Third Reich’, Journal of Social History, 19 (1985/6), pp. 427–8.

45. Samuelson, Plans for Stalin’s War Machine, pp. 191–5; N. S. Simonov ‘Mobpodgotovka: mobilisation planning in interwar industry’, in Barber and Harrison, Soviet Defence-Industry Complex, pp. 216–17.

46. J. Heyl ‘The Construction of the Westwall: an Example of National-Socialist Policy-making’, Central European History, 14 (1981), p. 72; R. E. Tarleton ‘What Really Happened to the Stalin Line?’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 6 (1993), pp. 21–61.