The Complete Yes Minister

Naturally he was chosen with care. But to what end: to produce a report that backs Sir Wally and Sir Humphrey? Naturally he was. But surely none of them would be foolish enough to cook up a report saying that metadioxin were safe if, in fact, it were dangerous. Naturally not. I think I’m going round in circles.

There was another possibility that I could raise though. ‘Suppose he produces one of those cautious wait-and-see reports?’

‘In that case,’ said Sir Humphrey cheerfully, ‘we don’t publish it, we use the American report instead.’

I was completely torn. On the one hand, the scheme is a wonderful one – the jobs, the income etc. – if it works out safely! And I’m assured it will. But if there’s an accident after I have given the go-ahead . . . The consequences would be too awful to contemplate.

‘Is there any chance he’ll produce a report saying the stuff’s dangerous?’ I wanted to know.

Humphrey was plainly baffled. ‘No. No chance. It isn’t dangerous,’ he said.

He clearly is totally sincere on this issue. And yet he’s suggesting we don’t publish a cautious wait-and-see type report if that’s what Henderson writes.

‘Why would you consider suppressing the Henderson report?’

He was outraged. ‘I would never suppress it, Minister. I merely might not publish it.’

‘What’s the difference?’

‘All the difference in the world. Suppression is the instrument of totalitarian dictatorships. You can’t do that in a free country. We would merely take a democratic decision not to publish it.’

That makes sense. But what would I say to the press and to Parliament, I wondered? That we had hoped the Henderson Committee would show we’d made the right decision but instead they’ve said we cocked it up, so we’re pretending the report doesn’t exist? I offered this suggestion to Humphrey.

He was not amused. ‘Very droll, Minister,’ he remarked.

So I asked Humphrey, ‘What would I say, if I decided not to publish it?’

‘There is a well-established government procedure for suppressing – that is, not publishing – unwanted reports.’

This was news to me. I asked how it was done.

‘You discredit them,’ he explained simply.

How? I made notes as he spoke. It occurred to me, that his technique could be useful for discrediting some of the party’s more idiotic research papers.

Stage one: The public interest

1) You hint at security considerations.

2) You point out that the report could be used to put unwelcome pressure on government because it might be misinterpreted. [Of course, anything might be misinterpreted. The Sermon on the Mount might be misinterpreted. Indeed, Sir Humphrey Appleby would almost certainly have argued that, had the Sermon on the Mount been a government report, it should certainly not have been published on the grounds that it was a thoroughly irresponsible document: the sub-paragraph suggesting that the meek will inherit the earth could, for instance, do irreparable damage to the defence budget – Ed.]

3) You then say that it is better to wait for the results of a wider and more detailed survey over a longer time-scale.

4) If there is no such survey being carried out, so much the better. You commission one, which gives you even more time to play with.

Stage two: Discredit the evidence that you are not publishing

This is, of course, much easier than discrediting evidence that you do publish. You do it indirectly, by press leaks. You say:

(a) that it leaves important questions unanswered

(b) that much of the evidence is inconclusive

(c) that the figures are open to other interpretations

(d) that certain findings are contradictory

(e) that some of the main conclusions have been questioned

Points (a) to (d) are bound to be true. In fact, all of these criticisms can be made of a report without even reading it. There are, for instance, always some questions unanswered – such as the ones they haven’t asked. As regards (e), if some of the main conclusions have not been questioned, question them! Then they have.

Stage three: Undermine the recommendations

This is easily done, with an assortment of governmental phrases:

(a) ‘not really a basis for long-term decisions . . .’

(b) ‘not sufficient information on which to base a valid assessment . . .’

(c) ‘no reason for any fundamental rethink of existing policy . . .’

(d) ‘broadly speaking, it endorses current practice . . .’

These phrases give comfort to people who have not read the report and who don’t want change – i.e. almost everybody.