The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB

72. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

73. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

74. While in New York “Abel” had sent to Moscow, at the GRU’s request, large-scale maps of American cities. Though this was not a very demanding assignment in the United States, similar maps were unobtainable for Soviet cities.

75. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

76. Donovan, Strangers on a Bridge, pp. 275, 414.

77. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

78. The SVR, which still propagates the heroic “Abel” myth, claimed in 1995 that, “Secrecy requirements do not yet allow the disclosure of many of the operations in which MARK participated.” Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 156-9.

79. Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, pp. 141-2.

Chapter Eleven The Main Adversary Part 2

1. See above, chapter 9.

2. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 2.

3. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 2.

4. Wise, Molehunt, pp. 186-7.

5. Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, pp. 245-6.

6. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 2.

7. Wise, Molehunt, pp. 188-9.

8. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 2. The Gallery Orlov, originally in South Pitt Street, Alexandria, later moved to King Street in the Old Town (Kessler, Undercover Washington, pp. 125-6).

9. Wise, Molehunt, pp. 191-4.

10. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 2.

11. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 2. Mrs. Orlov said later that her husband had told her the Soviet embassy had agreed to his request for asylum for them and their two young sons (Wise, Molehunt, p. 192).

12. Wise, Molehunt, ch. 13.

13. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 2; vol. 6, app. 1, parts 17, 41.

14. Kessler, Undercover Washington, p. 126.

15. k-4,136.

16. Barron, KGB, ch. 10. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 464-6.

17. k-4,136.

18. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 465-6.

19. Bamford, The Puzzle Palace, p. 144.

20. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 11.

21. Bamford, The Puzzle Palace, pp. 134-40.

22. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 11.

23. Bamford, The Puzzle Palace, p. 141.

24. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 11. From 1960 to 1963 the GRU had an important agent-in-place at NSA, Staff Sergeant Jack E. Dunlap (like Mitchell and Martin, a walk-in). In 1963 Victor Norris Hamilton, a former employee of NSA who had been forced to resign in 1959 because of mental illness, defected to the Soviet Union and gave a press conference much like Mitchell’s and Martin’s in 1960. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 462-4. Bamford, The Puzzle Palace, pp. 151-4.

25. Fursenko and Naftali, “Soviet Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” p. 77.

26. Bamford, The Puzzle Palace, pp. 142-3.

27. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 11. Mitrokhin’s notes on the 500 rouble monthly allowance are taken from Mitchell’s file and refer only to him. However, two years later, Martin told a reporter from The New York Times, whom he met in a chance encounter in a Leningrad café, that he had been given the same allowance. Theodore Shabad, “Defector from US Resigned to Soviet Union,” The New York Times (June 24, 1962). Bamford, The Puzzle Palace, p. 148. When Mitchell got a job, he was paid 100 roubles as a monthly salary and another 400 as a subsidy; vol. 6, ch. 11, part 11.

28. Information on Mitchell from vol. 6, ch. 11, part 11; on Martin from Shabad, “Defector from US Resigned to Soviet,” The New York Times (June 24, 1962).

29. vol. 6, ch. 11, part 11.

30. Bamford, The Puzzle Palace, p. 149. Martin died in Moscow of acute leukemia in 1986.

31. The source of the alarmist KGB report of Pentagon plans for a nuclear attack was “a document sent by a[n unidentified] liaison officer with the CIA to his own government” (Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble,” pp. 51-2). Though General Curtis LeMay, the belligerent head of Strategic Air Command, privately used the language of the pre-emptive strike, this never had any prospect of becoming the policy of the Eisenhower administration. Such language, however, caused some concern among the United States’ NATO allies. The British JIC, though believing it “highly unlikely that, with her democratic method of government and her close ties with other Western nations, [the USA] would ever provoke a war,” concluded in 1954 that it was “just possible that given (a) a more extreme government in the US, (b) increased US lack of confidence in some or all of her Western allies owing to political development in their countries, (c) some sudden advance in the USA in the sphere of weapons, etc., the counsels of impatience might get the upper hand.” JIC(54) 37 (I owe this information to Alex Craig of Christ’s College, Cambridge, currently completing a groundbreaking PhD on the JIC in the early Cold War).