The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB

133. Newton, The Butcher’s Embrace, p. 281.

134. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

135. Newton, The Butcher’s Embrace, pp. 281-2.

136. Philby, My Silent War, pp. 152-4.

137. Cecil, A Divided Life, p. 118.

138. VENONA decrypts, 3rd release, part 1, pp. 240-1.

139. This is acknowledged by Yuri Modin (Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends, p. 199).

140. Philby, My Silent War, p. 156. The KGB claim that the escapades which led to Burgess’s recall were pre-planned is not corroborated by Mitrokhin’s notes; they were much in line with similar, unpremeditated “scrapes” over the previous few years.

141. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

142. Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends, pp. 199-201.

143. Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends, pp. 202-3.

144. Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends, pp. 203-4; Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, pp. 338-9.

145. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 404; Cecil, A Divided Life, pp. 135ff.

146. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 16.

147. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 17.

148. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 19.

149. Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends, p. 251.

150. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 19.

151. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 18.

152. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

153. Philby, My Silent War, pp. 157-9.

154. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

155. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. In 1953 the illegal VIK also lost a hollow coin containing a microfilm message.

156. vol. 7, ch. 10, para. 19.

157. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 406; Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends, pp. 213-18. Modin is apparently unaware that Colville had recorded his 1939 meetings with Cairncross in his diary, and is wrongly skeptical of his ability to identify Cairncross as the author of a note describing one of those meetings, found in Burgess’s flat.

158. Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends, pp. 221-4, 229-32; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 406-7. Blunt finally confessed in 1964 in return for a guarantee of immunity from prosecution. He was not publicly identified as a former Soviet agent until 1979.

159. Philby, My Silent War, ch. 12; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 407-8; Knightley, Philby, pp. 147-8; Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends, pp. 224, 228-32.

160. Borovik, The Philby Files, p. 284.

161. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 24-6.

Chapter Ten The Main Adversary Part I

1. t-7,12; k-13,267; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 1. Mitrokhin’s notes omit to record Grigulevich’s alias as a Costa Rican diplomat, but the other details he provides (for example, the fact that on May 14, 1952 Grigulevich presented his letters of credence as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Costa Rica in Rome to the Italian president, Luigi Einaudi) clearly identify Grigulevich as “Teodoro B. Castro.” The members of the Costa Rican delegation to the Sixth Session of the UN General Assembly are listed in United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly Sixth Session, Plenary Meetings, p. xiv.

2. See above, chapter 6.

3. k-13,370.

4. k-13,267; k-26,194. The two other leading members of the Costa Rican delegation to Rome were Francisco Orlich, Minister of Public Works, and Daniel Oduber, ambassador in Paris (later president of Costa Rica from 1974 to 1978, and in 1980 deputy chairman of the Socialist International). Grigulevich appears to have won their confidence, too; his wife was received by them when she visited Costa Rica in 1952. On Figueres’s role in restoring constitutional government in Costa Rica, see Bird, Costa Rica, ch. 10.

5. k-13,267.

6. Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 580-1.

7. k-13,267; t-7,12; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 1. United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly Sixth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, p. 20.

8. k-13,267.

9. See above, chapter 9.

10. The VENONA decrypts led to very few arrests of Soviet spies, largely because SIGINT was considered too secret to be used in court, even in closed session. Even had it been used, it would have been open to a variety of legal challenges.

11. See above, chapters 7-8.

12. Klehr and Haynes, The American Communist Movement, ch. 4.

13. See above, chapter 9.

14. The Illegals Directorate planned a network of 28 “documentation agents” in Austria, 24 in East Germany, 24 in West Germany, 15 in France, 13 in the United States, 12 in Britain, 12 in Italy, 10 in Canada, 10 in Belgium, 9 in Mexico, 8 in Iran, 6 in Lebanon and 6 in Turkey (vol. 6, ch. 5, part 4). The large number of agents in Germany and Austria reflected the high proportion of Soviet illegals posing as refugees from East Germany.