The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB

Recently declassified US documents indicate that, under specified emergency conditions, senior American commanders had “predelegated” presidential authority to use nuclear weapons (Paul Lashmar, “Dr. Strangelove’s Secrets,” Independent, September 8, 1998). It is possible, but by no means certain, that a report of this from the KGB’s source, together with LeMay’s apocalyptic rhetoric, fueled the Centre’s fear of an American first strike.

32. Feklisov, Za okeanom i na ostrove, pp. 199-201. Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, pp. 236-40.

33. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 257ff.

34. Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, p. 242.

35. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 267ff.

36. Shelepin to Khrushchev, memorandum no. 1861-Sh (July 29, 1961). Decree no. 191/75-GS. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5. Cf. Zubok, “Spy vs. Spy,” pp. 28-30; Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, pp. 253-5.

37. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 278-9; Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 52-4.

38. Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble,” pp. 155, 168. On American covert action against Castro, see Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 271-2, 274-6, 280.

39. Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble,” ch. 9.

40. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 282-90.

41. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 285-95; Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, pp. 258-66; Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 52-4.

42. See above, chapters 7, 8.

43. Fursenko and Naftali, “Soviet Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis.” Mitrokhin’s notes add nothing to this admirable analysis, based on privileged access to SVR files, of KGB sources of political intelligence in Washington during the missile crisis. There is no indication in files noted by Mitrokhin to which Fursenko and Naftali did not have access, notably those on illegals, of any significant source which they have overlooked.

44. Fursenko and Naftali, “Soviet Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” p. 65.

45. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 237-8. Sakharovsky’s melancholy expression is clearly evident in the photograph which accompanies his official SVR hagiography (Samolis (ed.), Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 133-5).

46. Fursenko and Naftali, “Soviet Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” pp. 66, 75, 85n.

47. Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, pp. 266-7. Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble,” ch. 14. On October 26, Feklisov, the Washington resident, had two, now celebrated, meetings with the ABC diplomatic correspondent, John Scali, whom he knew had good access to the White House, to discuss ways to end the crisis. Kennedy was convinced that Feklisov spoke for Khrushchev personally. The KGB archives, however, show that he did not. Feklisov played no role either in Khrushchev’s proposal on October 26 to resolve the crisis by an American guarantee of Cuban territorial integrity, or in his attempt on October 27 to trade US bases in Turkey for Soviet missile sites in Cuba. It is possible that Shelepin, who—unlike Semichastny—was a member of the Presidium, had encouraged Semichastny to use a meeting between Feklisov and Scali to try to extract a US proposal to settle the crisis which would make the Soviet climbdown less humiliating. Because of the incomplete nature of KGB files on this episode, together with the conflict of oral evidence between Feklisov, Scali and Semichastny, it may never be possible to establish what led up to the meeting on the Soviet side. Fursenko and Naftali, “Using KGB Documents”; Fursenko and Naftali, “Soviet Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” pp. 80-3.

48. Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, p. 267. Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble,” pp. 284-6.

49. The fullest account of Penkovsky’s career is Schecter and Deriabin, The Spy Who Saved the World.

50. vol. 6, ch. 1, part 1.

51. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 6.

52. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 6.

53. vol. 6, ch. 1, part 1.

54. vol. 2, app. 3.

55. On Golitsyn’s impact on Angleton and the CIA, see Wise, Molehunt, and Mangold, Cold Warrior.

56. vol. 1, app. 3; vol. 6, ch. 1, part 1. On the US embassy’s decision to return Cherepanov’s documents, see Wise, Molehunt, pp. 121-3.

57. See below, chapter 22.

58. vol. 6, ch. 1, part 1; Nosenko’s codename appears in vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5.

59. vol. 2, app. 3.