The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB

105. k-2, 179; k-10, 135-6.

106. k-5, 787.

107. Brezhnev’s visit, however, led to enormous expenditure of KGB time and effort. Security procedures were overseen by a committee including the heads of no less than seven KGB directorates (Kryuchkov among them). Twenty-nine KGB and GRU operational groups were assigned to supervise Brezhnev’s security during the visit. k-5, 788-9.

108. k-8, 104. Soviet-FRG negotiations on the natural gas pipeline from Siberia were successfully concluded in November 1981. According to Sir Percy Cradock, later Mrs. Thatcher’s foreign policy adviser, the Reagan administration “found in the Polish crisis [of December 1981] a convenient pretext for sabotaging an agreement they did not like. Their action was at first confined to US companies, but in June 1982 it was extended, with little thought for the consequences, to US subsidiaries and foreign companies as well.” After vigorous protests by Mrs. Thatcher as well as by Schmidt, the United States backed down in November 1982 in return for NATO acceptance of greater restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union. Cradock, In Pursuit of British Interests, p. 56.

109. k-8, 104.

110. Mitrokhin did not have access to the SCD files which reveal the agent’s name.

111. k-13, 44. Mitrokhin’s notes do not record any response by the Schmidt government.

112. k-19, 282. The active measures against Strauss give the lie to Wolf ’s suggestions since the publication of his memoirs that Strauss was an HVA informant.

113. k-5, 718, k-19, 282. Inge Goliath had been withdrawn to the GDR in 1979. Mitrokhin’s notes summarize, but give few details about, a series of other KGB active measures designed to compromise the BND and BfV: operation JUNGLE, conducted jointly with the HVA from 1978 onwards to discredit the BND and disrupt its relations with other Western intelligence services (k-13, 61, 82, 102-3); operations ZHAK-RUZH, ROZA, BURGUNDER, OSMAN and PANTER (1978), designed, again in co-operation with the HVA, “to expose and impede the activity of the FRG special services in Europe and in the Near East” (k-13, 61); operation ONTARIO (1978), “to cause disagreements between the CIA, the SDECE and the BND” (k-13, 79); operation JAMES (1980), “to exacerbate disagreements between the BND and the CIA” (k-13, 102); operation KLOP (1981), to discredit the BfV (k-13, 85); operation ORKESTR (1981), to discredit West German journalists who were alleged to be BND officers or co-optees (k-13, 86); and operation DROTIK (1981), to compromise Western businesses allegedly used by the CIA and the BND as cover and for other operational purposes (k-13, 87).

114. k-5, 718, k-19, 282.

115. k-6, 102; k-19, 32.

116. Garton Ash, In Europe’s Name, p. 320.

117. Wolf, Man without a Face, p. 222.

118. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), More Instructions from the Centre, pp. 38-9.

119. Hanson, Soviet Industrial Espionage; US Government, Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant Western Technology; Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, p. 260.

120. RICHARD was first deployed in the FRG in 1964; k-16, 110, 129.

121. k-18, 441.

122. k-10, 39.

123. t-2, 34.

124. vol. 6, ch. 6.

125. Even when restrictions on the export of Western computers were relaxed during the Gorbachev era, fears that they were bugged or deliberately infected with viruses continued. Nikolai Brusnitsin, deputy chairman of the State Technical Commission, complained in 1990 that the software in a West German computer sold to a Soviet shoe-making factory had been deliberately pre-programmed to self-destruct. There had, he claimed, been a whole series of such incidents. Brusnitsin, Openness and Espionage, pp. 28-9.