The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB

122. Boyes, The Naked President, pp. 137-8.

123. Szulc, Pope John Paul II, pp. 395-6; Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 387-8.

124. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 388-9; Szulc, Pope John Paul II, pp. 396-7.

125. k-16, 500.

126. Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, p. 249.

127. Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, pp. 265-9; Lévesque, The Enigma of 1989, ch. 6.

128. Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, p. 288.

129. Interview with Shebarshin, Daily Telegraph (December 1, 1992).

Conclusion. From the One-Party State to the Yeltsin Presidency

1. Jukes, “The Soviets and ‘Ultra.’” Though Jukes’s conclusions are debatable, his 1988 article remains a pathbreaking study.

2. Kennedy-Pipe, Russia and the World, 1917-1991. Dr. Kennedy-Pipe’s otherwise valuable book is only one example of the continuing underestimation of the role of Soviet foreign intelligence even in some of the most recent work by leading Western scholars.

3. The significance of SIGINT was made clear by David Kahn’s pioneering The Codebreakers, published in 1967. Though a bestseller, however, its contents appeared to stun, rather than to inspire, most historians of international relations.

4. A growing minority of international relations, history and other departments in British universities now offer courses on intelligence, though on a much smaller scale than in north America. There is a flourishing British Study Group on Intelligence, with a largely academic membership, and an increasing number of similar groups in north America and continental Europe.

5. Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, p. 7.

6. Hosking, A History of the Soviet Union, p. 219.

7. Two of the leading historians of the Bolshevik Revolution, Orlando Figes and Richard Pipes, agree on describing the Cheka as “a state within a state.”

8. Volkogonov, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Empire, pp. 73-4.

9. Conquest, The Great Terror, pp. 468-70. It was a sign of the difficulty encountered by many Western historians in interpreting the Terror that Conquest’s was the only full-scale history of it published during the life of the Soviet Union.

10. Ostryakov, Voyennye Chekisty, p. 258.

11. k-25, 78. On the punitive use of psychiatry in the Soviet Union, see Bloch and Reddaway, Russia’s Political Hospitals.

12. k-25, 79. There is no suggestion in Mitrokhin’s notes that Voloshanovich was working for the KGB.

13. See above, chapter 20.

14. frag. 1,7. Mitrokhin’s notes give no details of the precise charges leveled against Korobov or of the length of his sentence.

15. k-3b, 136.

16. I am grateful to Dr. Clarissa de Waal of Newnham College, Cambridge, for these recollections of Tirana in 1992.

17. A further 3 percent were KGB co-optees.

18. t-7, 284.

19. t-7, 286. The behavior of the informers should not, in most cases, be harshly judged. Those who refused invitations to inform were likely to incur the ill will of the KGB towards themselves and their families.

20. frag. 5, 3.

21. Kalugin, Spymaster, pp. 287-98.

22. See above, chapter 20.

23. Kissinger subsequently acknowledged that Senator Pat Moynihan had been an exception. “Your crystal ball,” he told him, “was better than mine.” Moynihan, Secrecy, p. 6.

24. For example, the Russian sections of Eric Hobsbawm’s brilliant history of the twentieth century, Age of Extremes, include no mention of any of the heads of the Cheka and its successors, save for a passing reference to Andropov’s career before becoming General Secretary as “chief of the security apparatus” (p. 476).

25. There is, however, a one-line reference to Andropov’s subsequent emergence as Soviet leader in Vance’s reflections on the period after his resignation (Vance, Hard Choices, p. 421).

26. Gorbachev, however, acknowledged that, eighteen months or two years earlier, the coup might have succeeded.

27. Remnick, Resurrection. The American edition of this generally admirable study appeared in 1997.

28. k-13, 268.

29. Kennedy-Pipe, Russia and the World, 1917-1991, is the most recent of the many studies of Soviet foreign policy which make no mention of these aspects of it.

30. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only, pp. 149-52.

31. Truman, Year of Decisions, p. 346.

32. VENONA, BBC Radio 4 documentary written and presented by Christopher Andrew (producers: Mark Burman and Helen Weinstein), first broadcast March 18, 1998. Andrew, “The VENONA Secret.” The Centre received progress reports on VENONA from Weisband until 1950 and from Philby from 1949 to 1951.

33. See above, chapter 9.