The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB

16. t-7, 154. On January 22 Mikhail Zimyanin returned to Moscow from a fact-finding mission in Poland and gave an equally gloomy report to the Politburo (Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 255-6).

17. k-19, 511.

18. t-7, 155.

19. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 271-4.

20. k-20, 309.

21. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 276-84.

22. k-20, 110.

23. Kramer (ed.), “Declassified Soviet Documents on the Polish Crisis,” pp. 130-1.

24. Szulc, Pope John Paul II, ch. 24. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 293-307.

25. At the time, opinions within the Centre were divided on whether the KGB had been involved in the assassination attempt. About half the FCD officers with whom Oleg Gordievsky discussed the attempt were convinced that the KGB would no longer contemplate such a risky special action, even if it were subcontracted to the Bulgarian intelligence service. The other half, however, suspected that Department 8 of Directorate S, which was responsible for assassinations, had been involved; some told Gordievsky they only regretted that the attempt had failed. (Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 639.)

26. k-20, 101, 104.

27. k-20, 104.

28. k-20, 102. Olszowski was regarded as a KGB co-optee (k-19, 26).

29. k-20, 103. On June 7 Aristov, Kulikov and Pavlov telegraphed the Politburo to urge “the necessity of a direct dialogue with S. Kania about his departure from the post of the First Secretary” (k-20, 57).

30. k-20, 105.

31. k-20, 53.

32. k-20, 52.

33. k-20, 55.

34. k-20, 54.

35. k-19, 385.

36. k-20, 54, 102, 112.

37. Boyes, The Naked President, pp. 97-8.

38. k-19, 110.

39. k-19, 115.

40. Boyes, The Naked President, pp. 94-5.

41. k-19, 115.

42. k-19, 115.

43. k-19, 117.

44. k-19, 113.

45. k-19, 102.

46. k-19, 106.

47. k-19, 105.

48. k-19, 103.

49. k-19, 104.

50. Kramer (ed.) “Declassified Soviet Documents on the Polish Crisis,” pp. 132-3.

51. CPSU Secretary K. V. Rusakov told Honecker after Kania’s sacking, “We noticed that lately a difference began to appear between Kania and Jaruzelski in their approaches to basic questions. Jaruzelski began to show more and more readiness to accept violent measures in dealing with counter-revolution. We began to work with Jaruzelski. When doing this, we were influenced by the fact that Jaruzelski possessed greater authority in the army and also enjoyed the support of the ministers” (k-20, 338).

52. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 315-16.

53. k-20, 303.

54. Kramer (ed.), “Declassified Soviet Documents on the Polish Crisis,” pp. 133-4.

55. k-20, 311.

56. k-20, 327.

57. k-20, 307.

58. k-20, 304.

59. k-20, 327.

60. k-20, 308.

61. Ustinov denied, not wholly convincingly, that Kulikov had actually referred to the possibility of Soviet military intervention; Kramer (ed.), “Declassified Soviet Documents on the Polish Crisis,” pp. 134-7.

62. k-20, 315, 316.

63. k-20, 340.

64. k-20, 315.

65. k-20, 325.

66. k-20, 293.

67. k-20, 324.

68. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 334, 339.

69. Boyes, The Naked President, pp. 106-7.

70. k-20, 329.

71. k-20, 297.

72. Boyes, The Naked President, p. 107.

73. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 336-7.

74. k-20, 297.

75. k-20, 316.

76. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 337-9.

77. k-20, 323.

78. k-20, 296.

79. k-20, 298.

80. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 343-4.

81. k-19, 53.

82. k-19, 321.

83. k-19, 23.

84. Boyes, The Naked President, p. 108; Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, p. 348.

85. k-20, 249.

86. k-19, 23.

87. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, p. 348.

88. Boyes, The Naked President, pp. 307-9.

89. k-20, 249.

90. k-19, 261.

91. Boyes, The Naked President, p. 117.

92. k-19, 381.

93. k-19, 380.

94. k-19, 411.

95. k-19, 312.

96. k-19, 252.

97. k-19, 253.

98. k-19, 257.

99. k-19, 258.

100. k-19, 261. Mitrokhin’s notes do not record the content of Brezhnev’s message to Jaruzelski. On prosecutions after the declaration of martial law, see Swidlicki, Political Trials in Poland 1981-1986.

101. k-19, 642.

102. k-19, 311.

103. k-19, 324.

104. k-19, 326.

105. k-19, 328.

106. k-19, 337.

107. k-19, 339.

108. k-19, 128.

109. k-19, 124.

110. k-19, 143. Kiszczak expressed his thanks for material and technical assistance already received; Mitrokhin’s notes do not record the nature of this assistance.

111. k-19, 143.

112. k-1, 15.

113. k-19, 135.

114. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 376-7.

115. Szulc, Pope John Paul II, pp. 388-9.

116. Boyes, The Naked President, p. 131.

117. k-19, 143.

118. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, pp. 381-2.

119. Boyes, The Naked President, pp. 132-3.

120. Boyes, The Naked President, pp. 117, 134-6.

121. Boyes, The Naked President, pp. 117, 136-7.