The President nodded for him to continue.
“Iskander… or our Tomahawks for that matter, are tactical in that they can be moved around easily. The Iskanders in Kaliningrad are mounted on vehicles. You’ll have seen shots of them driving past the saluting stand at their May Day Parade in Moscow. They are smaller and have a much shorter range than an ICBM, but as I said, it is pretty academic once they start flying. They can carry a normal warhead or a nuclear one—again like our Tomahawks. And, like our Tomahawks, they are extremely accurate and difficult to knock down. But the key thing to remember is that even the smallest one of these is many, many times more powerful than the ones we dropped on Hiroshima or Nagasaki. Just imagine that mushroom cloud, magnified many times over, exploding over the cities of Western Europe.”
McCann looked around him and, although Bear knew the horrendous statistics, he found himself almost unable to breathe with the magnitude of what was being described.
Satisfied that he had made his message clear, McCann continued, “Now, the point for us here today is that the Russians moved
“So, how do they talk to each other?” asked Dillon, evidently guessing where this might be leading.
“By a number of means. The basis of the system is a two-way communications system called Signal A, with a sub-system known as V’yuga, all backed up by an emergency system: Perimetr. Signal A has a high degree of redundancy—that means back-up systems, in case the primary system fails—and is kept combat ready at all times. We know it is very reliable with several communications tracks, each with a different communications channel: radio, cable, satellite, tropospheric. V’yuga adds yet more backup with HF, VHF and a satellite link.”
“Sounds like they’ve thought things through,” commented Dillon.
“You’re dead right, ma’am. These guys know what they’re doing. On top of which, Signal A and V’yuga are interfaced electronically and algorithmically, which again ensures a high degree of security for all the communications channels. And as if that’s not enough, Perimetr—the back-up system—can transmit an order from the General Staff to the missile launchers direct, thus bypassing all intermediate command posts.”
McCann paused and the President gestured for him to continue.
“But there’s more to it than that. Despite the President and the Defense Minister having their own suitcase for command and control, actual physical control of the unlock and launch authorization codes resides with the military. In fact, the General Staff has direct access to these codes and can initiate a missile launch with or without permission of the political authorities.”
“So, if we captured the launch sites and the command posts, would we be able to take control of the missiles?”
“The million-dollar question, ma’am. We believe we can take control, but I will explain it at the end, so please bear with me. First though, while the Russians are focused on our main forces approaching the Baltics, 82nd Airborne will sneak in and secure the Kaliningrad launch sites. Meanwhile, our Special Forces will capture the command bunker from which all the sites are controlled. Once we’ve got them secured, we’ll redirect the missiles at the Russians. They’ll be bound to be threatening us once they realize what we’ve done, but we’ll be able to threaten them back. And with their own missiles. I can’t imagine the Russian people will exactly appreciate that scenario, especially once it’s all over social media, which we will ensure it is the moment it happens.”
Dillon leaned back and as she thought through the consequences and how it would work out politically, she began to smile. “If the President became a laughing stock after what the Latvians did to him in the forest, how much greater a humiliation this would be…”
Then her face hardened again. “But how many launch sites are there? How many missiles? And what do we have to put on the ground to grab them?”