1. Takehiko Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Mukden: The Rise of the Japanese Military
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 14 («life line» and «living space»); Seki Hiroharu, «The Manchurian Incident, 1931,» trans. Marius B. Jansen, in Japan Erupts: The London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident, 1928–1932, ed. James William Morley (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), pp. 139, 225–30; Sadako N. Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria: The Making of Japanese Foreign Policy, 1931–32 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 59–61, 1–16; G. R. Storry, «The Mukden Incident of September 18–19, 1931,» in St. Antony's Papers: Far Eastern Affairs 2 (1957), pp. 1–12.2. Franklin D. Roosevelt, «Shall We Trust Japan?» Asia
23 (July 1923), pp. 475–78, 526–28.3. James B. Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1936–1938
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 244–45 («government by assassination»); Mire Wilkins, «The Role of U.S. Business,» in Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931–1941, eds. Dorothy Berg and Shumpei Okamoto (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), pp. 341–45; Stephen E. Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 15; Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Mukden, chap. 6; FRUS: Japan, 1931–1941, vol. 1, p. 76.4. FRUS: Japan, 1931–1941,
vol. 1, pp. 224–25 («mission» and «special responsibilities»); Crowley, Japan's Quest, pp. 86–90 («national defense state»), 284–86 (hokushu), 289–97 («spirit»); Robert J. С Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 23, 55–70; Akira Iriye, Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967), pp. 207–08; Jerome B. Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949), pp. 133–37; Irvine H. Anderson, The Standard-Vacuum Oil Company and United States East Asian Policy, 1933–1941 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 221–31. Anderson is a key source on the oil side. Michael A. Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919–1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 28–29.5. Laura E. Hein, Fueling Growth: The Energy Revolution and Economic Policy in Postwar Japan
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 46–52; Anderson, Standard-Vacuum, pp. 81–90 («frightening» and «resistance»); Ickes, Secret Diary, vol. l, p. 192.6. Crowley, Japan's Quest,
p. 335 («unpardonable crime»); Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbour: The Coming of War Between the United States and Japan (New York: Atheneum, 1966), pp. 9–10 («thoroughgoing blow»), 12. Feis remains the classic diplomatic history, to be supplemented by Jonathan G. Utley, Going to War with Japan, 1937–1941 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1985). James William Morley, ed., The China Quagmire: Japan's Expansion on the Asian Continent, 1933–1941 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), pp. 233–86; Michael A. Barnhart, «Japan's Economic Security and the Origins of the Pacific War,» Journal of Strategic Studies 4 (June 1981), p. 113; Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 147–55 («quarantine» and «without declaring war»).7. Utley, Going to War,
pp. 36–37 («moral embargo»); Feis, Pearl Harbor, p. 19 («not yet»).