His concessions over the Kurile Islands, which had long been a bone of contention with Japan, at least improved relations with that country, and he also contributed to better relations with China, which had been managing its economic transition so much more skilfully than Russia had done. In October 1999 he was constrained to approve Putin’s decision to send Russian forces back into Chechnya. The soft line there which Berezovskii had advocated had not been effective. The bandit gangs were out of control, and Islamic fundamentalism was gaining strength. Early in August, Khattab and Shamil Basaev had led a group of armed fundamentalists into neighbouring Dagestan. Russian military operations in Dagestan turned out to be much more succesful than they had been in Chechnya itself in the earlier war — partly, perhaps, because the Americans, alarmed now about the Muslim fundamentalism in the region, offered help to disrupt the insurgents’ communications. However, the principal reason was that the Dagestanis, who had voted for the Communists in the recent elections, disliked fundamentalism.
28But by now even Yeltsin understood that he had run out of options. At the end of the year he suddenly announced that he was stepping down. Elections for a new president would be held in March 2000. In the meanwhile, in accordance with the constitution, the Prime Minister would act as caretaker. Before he stepped down, however, Yeltsin elicited an assurance from Putin that he would not be prosecuted. Putin moved into office on 1 January 2000.
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Although most of the Western press regarded Putin with suspicion, characterizing him as authoritarian, and repeatedly reminding the public of his KGB past, his popularity rating among Russians climbed steadily After a decade of misery and disorder, the prospect of firm government now seemed very welcome. Now that opinion had turned against terrorism, the new war in Chechnya was popular too. Even the KGB — now called the Federal Security Service (FSB) — was coming to be well regarded, thanks partly to a public-relations campaign presenting it as Russia’s shield against its foreign enemies. One of Putin’s first presidential actions was to restore Yuri Andropov’s bust to prominence at FSB headquarters — a shrewd move, since Andropov, himself a former KGB chief, had been the godfather of radical reform and also represented the good, stable times before the collapse. In March 2000 Putin was duly elected.
A greater contrast with his predecessor could hardly be imagined. Putin was as slight and fit as Yeltsin was burly and ailing; as collected and deliberate as Yeltsin was erratic and unbridled; as discreet and measured as Yeltsin was ebullient and greedy — and a good deal more knowledgeable about the wider world. The article he published on the government’s web site on the eve of becoming interim president presented a realistic summation of Russia’s position and a well-judged statement of his priorities. Nor did he fail to project a personal image to the public. In an autobiography by interview he spoke about having been ‘a hooligan’ at school, and of his passions for the martial arts and for books and films about spies. He also spoke frankly about his previous career, not concealing an acquaintance with Boris Berezovskii and saying one or two pleasant things about Yeltsin while firmly distancing himself from both. And what he said in public struck an immediate chord with the people. ‘We are a rich country of poor people,’ he told them. He spoke of his ‘pride in the fatherland’, and told them straightforwardly that ‘for Russia a strong state … is … the guarantee of order, the initiator and main driving force for change.’
29Although realistic about his country’s capabilities and the strengths of its adversaries, he contrived to take a positive line in foreign affairs. Claiming that ‘a power with a geopolitical position like Russia has national interests everywhere’, he reasserted Russia’s claims in the Caspian, took a tougher line on Ukrainian and Georgian debt, adopted a bolder position in Transcaucasia and Central Asia, worked towards a ‘strategic partnership’ with China and improved relations with Iran and India. But he also tried to reach an accommodation with NATO,
30 and after 11 September 2001 he co-operated with the USA over terrorism, while preserving a sphere for Russia’s ally in Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance.